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Abstract
We re-examine, from a political economy perspective, the standard view that higher capital
mobility results in lower capital taxes - a view, in fact, that is not confirmed by the available
empirical evidence. We show that when a small economy is opened to capital mobility, the change
of incidence of a tax on capital - from capital owners to owners of the immobile factor - may interact
in such a way with political decision-making so as to cause a rise in the equilibrium tax. This can
happen whether or not the fixed factor (labour) can be taxed.
∗We would like to thank David de Meza, Gareth Myles and seminar participants at CORE,
Bristol, Warwick, Exeter and CRETE-2003 for comments. The usual disclaimer applies.
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1 Introduction
In spite of the now large literature on capital tax competition, there have been relatively few systematic
analyses of the interaction between the level of tax competition and the political process by which taxes
are chosen. An early and important exception1 is Persson and Tabellini(1992) - henceforth PT - who
stress that with tax competition, voters in a country generally vote strategically by choosing a candidate
who, once in oﬃce, will tax capital more than the median voter would. In their model, such a candidate
has less than the median endowment of capital i.e. is poorer. Via this strategic delegation, the voters
precommit to a higher tax rate, thus counteracting the ex post incentive of the policy-maker, once in
oﬃce, to under-tax capital. So, intensification of tax competition, due to increased capital mobility
(capital market integration, CMI), will also induce a change in to a more pro-tax candidate.
In this paper, we identify a rather diﬀerent interaction between changes in CMI and the political
process. This works through the impact that CMI has on the incidence of the tax on capital. Unlike
PT, this eﬀect does not require representative democracy or strategic behavior by countries. Indeed,
in our model, countries are small and democracy is direct. Nevertheless, the eﬀect of this interaction
is quite striking: under empirically quite plausible conditions, the equilibrium tax on capital can rise
following CMI, in contrast to the standard conclusion that taxes and public good provision are lower in
economies open to capital mobility2.
The key feature of our model is that (unlike PT) there are two factors of production in every
country, one internationally immobile (labour) and one possibly internationally mobile (capital), and the
before-tax prices of factors are not fixed. Indeed, our model is simply the standard Zodrow-Mieskowski
(1986) one, but where agents in any country are allowed to be completely heterogeneous in their labour
and capital endowments, and also their preferences over the public good3. Decisions over tax rates are
made by majority voting.
In this model, following capital market integration, the incidence of the capital tax changes : the
burden of the tax shifts from owners of capital to owners of labour. As agents within a given country
are heterogenous, the change in the incidence of the capital tax, following CMI, will generally cause a
change in the attitude of the median voter toward taxation (and may also change the identity of the
median voter - but this is not crucial).
Specifically, without capital mobility, owners of capital bear the entire burden of the tax, as the
after-tax price of capital decreases and the wage is fixed by the level of inelastically supplied savings.
1Other, more recent contributions are discussed in Section 6.
2It is worth noting that in the PT model, although the strategic delegation eﬀect works in to raise taxes following CMI,
in the symmetric equilibrium that they analyse, it never fully oﬀsets the basic economic eﬀect of CMI which is to lower
the equilibrium tax.
3Our results therefore also extend in various ways (fully explained in Section 6) the many papers that use this model.
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With capital mobility, instead, the entire burden of the tax is shifted to owners of the immobile factor
of production (labour), as each country takes the world interest rate as given, and the wage depends
on the net flow of capital. Then, by the tax incidence eﬀect, the median voter in the closed economy
case is the owner of the median share of the capital endowment relative to his valuation of public good
(the preference-adjusted capital endowment) whereas the median voter in the open economy case is
the owner of the median share of the labour endowment relative to his valuation of public good (the
preference-adjusted labour endowment) 4
So, other things equal, if the median voter’s share of the preference-adjusted capital endowment
is high, and his share of the preference-adjusted labour endowment is low, the median voter’s demand
for the public good (and therefore the tax) will be low in the closed economy, and high in the open
economy. Call this the tax incidence eﬀect of capital market integration.
Of course, following capital market integration, other things are not equal: from the point of
view of the median voter in a given country, the elasticity of supply of capital, formerly zero, is now
positive, and so the marginal cost of public funds rises from unity to a value greater than unity, causing
the policy-maker to choose a lower tax. Call this latter eﬀect the tax competition eﬀect.
However - and this is the main result of our paper - in our model, it is perfectly possible for the
tax incidence eﬀect to outweigh the tax competition eﬀect, so that equilibrium tax rates rise, following
capital market integration. Indeed, under some conditions (basically, when the marginal cost of public
funds is close to unity in the open economy) the diﬀerence in the median shares does not have to be
large to result in a rise in capital taxes.5
Our paper is related to three literatures. First, there are some papers which show that equilibrium
taxes may rise in some or all countries following CMI (for instance, DePater and Myers (1994), Wilson
(1987), Huizinga and Nielsen (1997), Noiset(1995) and Wooders, Zissimos and Dhillon(2001)). However,
in these models, the rise in taxes is generated by some modification of the economic environment relative
to the standard tax competition model, rather than any interaction between tax incidence and the
political process. These contributions are all discussed in more detail in Section 6.
Second, there is a growing body of empirical evidence that CMI has not clearly led to cuts in
corporate tax rates, at least for OECD countries. Specifically, recent studies by Hallerberg and Basinger
(1998), (2001), Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano(2002), Garrett(1998), Quinn(1997) Rodrik(1997),
Swank and Steinmo(2002)) find rather mixed eﬀects of relaxation of exchange controls on the capital
4Note that these may in fact be diﬀerent agents, so we may have a shifting median voter. However, as argued below,
the shifting median voter per se does not drive our results.
5Of course, the logic of the above argument is that a necessary condition for this to occur is that the preference-adjusted
endowments of the fixed factor are more unequally distributed than those of the mobile factor. Note however, that this
may not be inconsistent with the empirical regularity that that labour income is less unequally distributed than capital
income (see for instance Goodman et. al. (1997)). We return to this issue below.
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account on corporate tax rates. Our paper provides one possible explanation for this. Some of the
evidence, and a review of competing explanations, including our own, is presented in Section 5.
Finally, there is a view in the political economy literature that (at least when preferences are
single-peaked) models of direct democracy are observationally very similar to models with benevolent
dictators who maximise (for example) the sum of utilities. Indicative of this view are the models and
discussions in Persson and Tabellini (2000) pp. 319, 331 and Besley and Smart (2001). Our analysis
shows that this is not always the case: the comparative statics of our model when CMI changes is
qualitatively diﬀerent with a median voter and a benevolent dictator.
The organization of the paper is the following: Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 charac-
terizes the equilibria with and without capital mobility when labour taxes are constrained to be zero.
Section 4 does the same in the general case. In Section 5 we discuss some empirical evidence on the
eﬀects of CMI on capital taxes. Section 6 discusses related literature in some depth and finally, Section
7 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
There are a large number of identical countries. Each country is populated by a number of agents
i ∈ N = {1, ..n}, where n is odd. Agent i in any country is endowed with ki units of capital and li units
of labour, each of which can be sold to firms as an input. Let
P
i∈N ki = 1,
P
i∈N li = 1. There is a
number of identical firms in each country, which transform the two inputs into the consumption good
using a constant-returns technology. The labour input is internationally immobile, but the capital input
may be internationally mobile or not. The government in any country provides a public good by taxing
the income generated by the use of capital and labour inputs. Capital income is taxed on a source basis.
The timing of events is as follows. First, the taxes are determined by majority voting at the
beginning of the period. Then, firms choose their capital and labour inputs, and the prices of the
factors are determined. Finally, production and consumption take place.
The utility of agent i in any country is
ui = ci + γiv(g) (1)
where ci is the level of the consumption good, g is a level of public good provision and γi measures
i0s relative preference for the public good. Also, v(.) is assumed to have the standard properties that
v0(.) > 0 and v00(.) < 0 for all non-negative g. Note that agent i does not value leisure so that labour
time li will always be inelastically supplied. The personal budget constraint is
ci = rki + (w − τw)li (2)
where r and w are prices of the capital and labour inputs respectively, r is understood to be the price
net of tax, and τw is the tax on labour income. Substituting the personal budget constraint (2) into
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(1), we get:
ui = rki + (w − τw)li + γiv(g) (3)
Now consider the behaviour of firms. These are assumed competitive, i.e. they take factor prices
as given. Due to the assumed constant returns to scale, and
P
i∈N li = 1, we can suppose that there
is only one firm in each country, with a production function in intensive form of F (k), where k is the
amount of capital employed by the firm in a typical country. F (.) has the standard properties, F (0) = 0,
F 0(.) > 0, F 00(.) < 0. In the closed economy case, the price of the capital input adjusts to the point
where it is optimal for the firm to use the country’s aggregate endowment of capital i.e.
F 0(1) = rc + τr (4)
where τr is the tax on capital income. In the open economy case, the demand for capital by the firm is
implicitly given by
F 0(k) = ro + τ r (5)
Finally, the wage adjusts to the point where it is optimal for the firm to employ one unit of labour, so
the wage is
w(k) = F (k)− kF 0(k) (6)
noting that if the economy is closed then k = 1.
Turning now to the determination of the taxes, the government budget constraint is g = τrk +
τw where k = 1 in the closed economy case. So, substituting the government budget constraint and (4)
into (3), and dividing by γi, the overall payoﬀ to i, up to a constant, is
ui =



(F 0(1)− τr)αi + (w(1)− τw)βi + v(τr + τw) (closed)
roαi + (w(k)− τw)βi + v(τrk + τw) (open)
(7)
where kiγi
= αi, liγi = βi. We will call αi,βi the preference-adjusted capital and labour endowments.
Note that although heterogeneity is three-dimensional (agents can diﬀer in both endowments, and
perferences), eﬀective heterogeneity is two-dimensional.
Then, (τw, τ r) are determined simultaneously in each country by majority voting as described in
the following sections. In particular, in the open-economy case, the voters in each country are assumed
to take ro as given
6 (i.e. each country is assumed small relative to the international market for the
capital input), in which case they rationally anticipate that the capital employed in that country will be
determined by (5), given tax τ r. Also, taxes must be feasible in the sense that they generate non-negative
revenue (as g ≥ 0) and also imply non-negative post-tax prices for labour and capital.
As these feasibility constraints play an important role in what follows, it is helpful to state them
formally. Non-negative revenue requires that τw + kτr ≥ 0. From (6), a non-negative wage requires
6Implicitly, they also take the taxes in other countries as given, but these taxes only aﬀect citizens’ payoﬀs though ro.
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τw ≤ w(k). From (4), in the closed economy, a non-negative price of capital rc ≥ 0 requires τr ≤ F 0(1).
In the open economy case, as ro is exogenous, there is no upper bound on τr. So, in the closed economy
case, recalling k = 1, the feasible set of taxes is
Sc = {(τw, τr) |τw + τr ≥ 0, τw ≤ w(1), τ r ≤ F 0(1)}
In the open-economy case, taking ro as given, and recalling k = k(ro + τ r), the feasible set of taxes is
So = {(τw, τ r) |τw + k(ro + τ r)τr ≥ 0, τw ≤ w(k(ro + τ r))}
Note that we have allowed the taxes to be individually negative i.e. we allow for a wage or capital
subsidy. The reason for doing so is discussed in Section 4 below.
Note that if τw = 0, so that only the mobile factor is taxed, then the model is eﬀectively the
well-known model of Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson(1986) (ZMW model henceforth),
extended to allow (completely generally) for heterogeneity in the ownership of factors of production and
in preferences.
Finally, we note that an analysis of the model as it stands is somewhat involved, because the
policy space (τw, τ r) is two-dimensional in each country. Consequently, with unrestricted distributions
of preference-adjusted capital and labour endowments {αi}i∈N , {βi}i∈N , voting cycles will generally
arise. So, we begin in the next Section, Section 3, by illustrating the tax incidence eﬀect, and obtaining
our key results in the special setting where the fixed factor is untaxed i.e. τw = 0. In this case, from
Sc, So, the feasibility constraints on the capital tax are simply 0 ≤ τ r ≤ F 0(1) in the closed economy,
and τr ≥ 0 in the open economy.
3 Capital Market Integration and Tax Competition with an
Untaxed Fixed Factor
3.1 Majority Voting Equilibrium in Closed and Open Economies
First consider the closed economy. Recall that τw = 0 by assumption, and set τr = τ . Then, from (7),
the payoﬀ of agent i ∈ N in any country is
ui(τ) = (F 0(1)− τ)αi + w(1)βi + v(τ) (8)
It is clear from (8) that only the weights αi given by preference-adjusted capital endowments will aﬀect
voter preferences over τ . Note that t ui(τ) is strictly concave in τ as v is assumed strictly concave. So,
preferences over τ are single-peaked for all i ∈ N. Let τ ci be the ideal tax of agent i i.e. the tax that
maximises (8) subject to the feasibility constraint that τ ∈ [0, F 0(1)]. For an interior solution, this is
given by the condition
v0(τ ci ) = αi (9)
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That is, the marginal benefit of the public good is equal to type i0s preference-adjusted share of the
capital stock. This is because the tax is borne entirely by immobile capital; αi is also i0s share of the
cost of the public good. Note also that if αi > v0(0), then we have a corner solution with τ ci = 0, and if
αi < v0(F 0(1)), then we have a corner solution with τ ci = F 0(1).
Now, let p ∈ N be the agent with the median preference-adjusted capital endowment.7 It follows
from the fact that τ ci is decreasing in αi that the voter with the median ideal tax is just the median
voter with respect to the preference-adjusted capital endowment. Then, the outcome of majority voting
over τ will be that τ cp is chosen. In what follows, we will assume that τ cp is interior. So we have proved:
Proposition 1. Assume v0(0) ≥ αp ≥ v0(F 0(1)). Then, in the closed economy case, the equilibrium tax
in each country is τ c = τ cp, where τ cp solves (9) above with i = p.
Now consider the open economy case. Here, as each country is small, voters take ro as fixed and
thus from (5), they perceive that k = k(ro + τ), with dk/dτ = 1/F 00(k). So, from (7), the pay-oﬀ of
agent i in any country, is
ui(τ , ro) ≡ roαi + w(k(ro + τ))βi + v(τk(ro + τ)). (10)
It is now clear from (10) that only the weights βi given by the preference-adjusted labour endowments
will aﬀect voter preferences over τ .We will assume that the above function is strictly quasi-concave with
respect to τ for any βi and any ro, which is suﬃcient to ensure that preferences over τ are single-peaked
for all i ∈ N, given ro fixed. Let τoi be the ideal tax of a type i agent. This maximises (10) subject to
the constraint that the tax be feasible i.e. that τ ∈ [0,∞). Assuming an interior solution, after simple
manipulation, we see that τoi satisfies the simple condition:
v0(τoik(ro + τoi )) = µ(τoi , k(ro + τoi ))βi (11)
where
µ(τ , k) =
1³
1 + τkF 00(k)
´
is the marginal cost of public funds (MCPF) in the open economy, evaluated at any τ , for a fixed ro. If
βi > v0(0), then we have a corner solution with τoi = 0.
From (11), the marginal cost of a unit of the public good to i is now his preference-adjusted
share βi of labour, the immobile factor (as the tax now falls entirely on the immobile factor), times the
marginal cost of public funds. Given the assumptions made so far, it can be shown straightforwardly8
that the higher the cost share βi, the lower the ideal tax τoi at a given interest rate ro.
7Formally, for any i, let Ai = {j ∈ N |αj ≤ αi } , and ai = #Ai/n. Then, p is the value of the index for which ap−1 <
0.5 < ap
8Strict quasi-concavity of ui(τ , ro) with respect to τ for any βi and any ro implies that ∂2ui(τoi , ro)/∂τ2 < 0. This in
turn implies directly that the ratio v0(τoi k(ro + τoi ))/µ(τoi , ro) is strictly decreasing with τoi for any βi. Hence, we can see
directly from (11) that the higher βi, the lower τoi , as long as τoi is interior.
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Now let q ∈ N be the agent with the median preference-adjusted labour endowment.9 So, it
follows that in the open economy case, the voter with the median ideal tax is now just the median voter
with respect to the preference-adjusted labour endowment. Then, the outcome of majority voting over
τ will be that voter q will prevail. Note that in the open economy case, τoq depends on ro, but as all
countries are identical, the only possible equilibrium is where taxes are the same in all countries, and
hence ro is such that k(ro + τoq) = 1. If q0s ideal tax is interior, it will therefore satisfy
v0(τoq) = µ(τoq, 1)βq (12)
As in the closed economy case, we wish, for simplicity, to restrict attention to interior equilibrium taxes
i.e. those satisfying (12). This requires v0(0) ≥ βq. Also, as in equilibrium ro = F 0(1) − τoq, we must
restrict attention to equilibrium taxes τoq ≤ F 0(1) which imply a non-negative world interest rate. This
requires βq ≥ v0(F 0(1))/µ(F 0(1), 1). So, we have proved:
Proposition 2. Assume v0(0) ≥ βq ≥ v0(F 0(1))/µ(F 0(1), 1). Then, in the open economy case, the
equilibrium tax in each country is τo = τoq, where τoq solves (12) above.
3.2 Capital Market Integration and Tax Competition
Following CMI, three things will happen. First, for any positive tax lower than the revenue-maximising
tax, the marginal cost of public funds rises from unity to µ > 1, as the supply of capital is now no
longer fixed in each country. Other things equal, this will lower the equilibrium tax, a well-known and
standard result.
However, with heterogenous agents, there are two other eﬀects of CMI. First, the identity of
the median voter may change i.e. p 6= q, which we call the shifting median voter eﬀect. In general, a
necessary condition for the existence of the shifting median voter eﬀect is that the preference-adjusted
endowments are not perfectly positively or negatively rank-correlated, i.e. that it is not possible to label
citizens so that α1 ≤ α2 ≤ ...αn and either β1 ≤ β2 ≤ ..βn or βn ≤ βn−1 ≤ ...β1.
Second, whether or not there is a shifting median voter, if the median preference-adjusted capital
share is not equal to the median preference-adjusted labour share (i.e. αp 6= βq), other things equal,
the median voter’s choice of tax rate will change. This is clear as from (9), the equilibrium tax in the
closed economy case is determined by αp, but from (12), the equilibrium tax in the open economy case
is determined by βq. As already remarked, this is due to the fact that in the closed economy, the tax
burden is entirely borne by capital, whereas in the open economy case, it is borne by labour. So, we
say that there is an incidence eﬀect when αp 6= βq.
To understand the importance of these two eﬀects, our first benchmark result describes what
happens if both eﬀects are absent.10 This occurs, for instance, when the preference-adjusted capital
9Formally, letBi =
©
j ∈ N
¯¯
βj ≤ βi
ª
, and bi = #Bi/n. Then q ∈ N is the value of the index for which bq−1 < 0.5 < bq .
10In all following results, we assume that the conditions in Propositions 1 and 2 hold.
8
share of any i is equal to her preference-adjusted labour share i.e. αi = βi = λi, all i ∈ N. Then, we can
rank agents by this common share i.e. λ1 ≤ λ2 ≤ ...λn. In this case, the median voter in both closed
and open economies is m = (n+ 1)/2 i.e. in our notation, p = q = m.
Proposition 3. If there is no incidence eﬀect or shifting median voter eﬀect i.e. if p = q = m and
αm = βm = λm, then τ c > τo.
Proof. If αp = βq = λm, then the conditions defining τ c, τo become
v0(τ c) = λm, v0(τo) = µ(τo, 1)λm
So, as F 00 < 0 and τo > 0, µ(τo, 1) > 1, we have v0(τo) > v0(τ c). But then by strict concavity of v,
τo < τ c. ¤
That is, we have the standard result11 that CMI will reduce the equilibrium tax, because capital
mobility leads to a higher cost of public funds.
Now we show how this “standard” result can be overturned by the incidence eﬀect. This happens
in a very simple and striking way. The general idea is illustrated in Figure 1 below.
Figure 1 in here
The figure graphs the marginal benefit of the public good, g i.e. v0(g), and also the marginal
cost to the relevant median voter of providing that level of the public good (αp in the closed economy,
and βqµ(g, 1) in the open economy). In the Figure, the median voter in the closed economy has a high
preference-adjusted capital share, and thus desires a low level of g and thus a low tax, but the median
voter in the open economy has a low preference-adjusted labour share, and thus desires a higher level
of g and thus a higher tax. This eﬀect more than oﬀsets the reduction in the tax due to an increase in
the marginal cost of public funds generated by capital mobility i.e. the fact that µ is increasing in g.
Of course, the Figure merely illustrates a possibility: the following example shows that this possi-
bility can actually occur. This example is also constructed so that the actual distribution of endowments
has capital more unequally distributed than labour, consistently with the available evidence which sug-
gests that wage income is less unequally distributed than non-wage income (see for instance Goodman
et. al. (1997)). But, by choice of {γi}i∈N , the preference-adjusted capital endowment is less unequally
distributed than the corresponding labour endowment, which is what is needed for τo > τ c.
Example. Assume quadratic preferences and technology i.e. v(g) = (g − ζg2)/2, ζ > 0, and F (k) =
k − φk2/2, 1 > φ > 0. The constraints on φ ensure that F (k) has the standard properties in the
neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium i.e. F 0(1) = 1 − φ > 0, F 00(1) = −φ < 0. We also need to
assume that v0 is positive at all feasible taxes, which, from concavity, requires only that v0(F 0(1)) =
1
2 − ζ(1− φ) > 0.
11Note that the classic results of Zodrow and Mieszkowski(1986), Wilson(1986) follow from Proposition 3, because if all
agents are identical, i.e. ki = li =
1
n
, all i ∈ N, the hypotheses of Proposition 3 are clearly satisfied.
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So, by Proposition 1, the equilibrium tax in the closed economy will be zero if αp ≥ v0(0) =
0.5. Moreover, by Proposition 2, the equilibrium tax in the open economy will be strictly positive
if βq < v0(0) < 0.5.
We construct αp, βq as follows. Assume n = 3. Now choose (k1, k2, k3) = (0, 0.1, 0.9), (l1, l2, l3) =
(0, 0.3, 0.7). Note that k2 < l2 < 1/3. So, endowments are unequally distributed (the distributions of
endowments are left-skewed), with capital income being more unequally distributed than labour income.
Suppose also that γ1 = 2, γ3 = 1.8 and γ2 = 0.2. These imply that (a1, a2, a3) = (0, 1/2, 1/2) and
(β1,β2,β3) = (0, 3/2, 7/18). So, p = q = 3, and ap = 1/2 > 7/18 = βq, implying that τ c = 0, τo > 0 as
required. k
In the above example, the citizen with the larger than the median labour endowment has a high
valuation for public good suﬃciently high to make him the median voter when voters are ranked by
preference-adjusted endowments. This citizen also has a larger preference-adjusted capital endowment
than labour endowment: it fact it is suﬃceintly larger to ensure that the tax rate will rise following CMI.
The example highlights the fact that, in order to have a tax increase following CMI when wage income
is less unequally distributed than non-wage income, the ditsribution of valuations for public need not
be positively or negatively related to the distributions of endowment. In fact, all that is needed is that
some citizen who is richer than the citizen with the median labour endowment has a suﬃciently high
valuation of public good so that she possesses the median preference-augmented labour endowment,
with the latter also being suﬃciently lower than the median preference-augmented capital endowment.
The following more general construction demonstrates. Suppose that capital and labour endowments
are not perfectly-rank correlated. In particular, assume that k1 < ... < km < ... < kn and l1 < ... < lm−1
< lm+1 < lm < lm+2 < ... < ln, with m = (n + 1)/2. Thus, m is the median capital endowment and
m + 1 is the median labour endowment. Suppose also that km < lm+1 and γ1 = ... = γm = 1. Then,
if km+1 ≥ n−12 km > ln we have that there is a distribution of relative valuations for public good over
citizens m+ 1, m+ 2, ..., n so that ap > βq. To see this, note first that n−m = n−12 is the number of
citizens with larger than the median capital endowments. Notice then, due also to
P
i∈N γi = n, that
the smallest preference-adjusted capital endowment on the part of the citizens who are richer in capital
than the median capitalist m is km+1/(n−m).Thus, p = m and αp = km. Notice also, due to km < lm+1
and ln/(n −m) < km, that n −m > lj/km > 1 for any j = m + 2, ..., n. It follows then directly that
any distribution of relative valuations for public good {γj}j=nj=m+1 with γm+1 = 1,
j=nP
j=m+1
γj = n −m,
γj ≤ lj/lm−1 and γs > ls/km for some s ≥ m+2 leads to q ≥ m+2 and βq < αp (as βj ≥ βm−1 = lm−1
and βs = ls/γs < km < lm+1 = βm+1).
The final and important question then arises as to “how big” the incidence eﬀect (i.e. diﬀerence
between αp and βq) needs to be to get a reversal of the standard result. To answer this question, note
that if the median voters in closed and open economies have preference-adjusted capital and labour
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shares αp,βq > 0 respectively, then they will choose the same taxes in closed and open economy cases if
αp = µ(τ(αp), 1)βq ≡ ψ(αp,βq)
where τ(αp) = v0−1(αp) is the tax chosen by the median voter in the closed economy. Moreover, it is
clear from (9),(12) that if α > ψ(α,β), τo > τ c, and vice versa. Formally, we have:
Proposition 4. τo is greater, equal to, or less than τ cas αp > ψ(αp,βq), αp = ψ(αp,βq), or αp <
ψ(αp,βq) respectively.
Note, due to µ > 1, that ψ(α,β) > l. So, the quantity
η =
µψ(αp,βq)
βq
− 1
¶
× 100% > 0
is the minimum percentage by which the median preference-adjusted capital endowment must exceed
the median preference-adjusted labour endowment in order to get a reversal of the standard result that
the equilibrium tax falls following CMI. Example A1 in the Appendix shows, for appropriate choice of
parameter values, that η can be small: indeed, it is possible to choose parameters so that η can be
arbitrarily close to zero. The intuition is that for appropriate choice of parameters, the marginal cost
of public funds µ can be made arbitrarily close to one around τ(αp).
Before leaving this Section, note that in Proposition 3, we have assumed also that median voter
does not shift. However, the inspection of the proof of this proposition makes it clear that non-shifting
is not required (the result goes though as long as αp = βq, even if p 6= q). In other words, shifting
median voter eﬀect in itself has no eﬀect at all on equilibrium taxes12, and thus on the relationship
between τ c and τo. It is, nevertheless interesting (and not noted in the literature, to our knowledge)
that the identity of the median voter changes following the opening of the economy.
4 Capital Market Integration and Tax Competition: the Gen-
eral Case
This main result above has been derived for the case where labour income is not taxed, but the same
basic eﬀect will be at work if both labour and capital can be taxed at diﬀerent rates. There are
complications, however: in particular, as the policy space is then multi-dimensional, some restrictions
on the joint distribution of capital and labour endowments are required to ensure a well-defined median
voter and thus a Condorcet Winner. Our main finding is that when the median voter has a relatively
larger capital than labour endowment, he will choose a capital subsidy in the closed economy, but the
capital tax in the open economy is zero. So, our basic finding is robust to the taxation of labour.
12Another way of seeing this is to take an initial situation where the median voter does not shift (p = q), and then
consider a permutation of the labour endowments across individuals. So, now there is a shifting median voter. But, the
share of the median voter with respect to preference-adjusted labour endowments, and thereby the incidence eﬀect, has
not changed. So neither τo nor τc change.
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4.1 Majority Voting Equilibrium in Closed and Open Economies
First consider the closed economy. From (7), the payoﬀ of agent i ∈ N in any country is
ui(τw, τr) = (F 0(1)− τr)αi + (w(1)− τw)βi + v(τ r + τw) (13)
It is now clear from (13) that both the preference-adjusted capital endowment αi and the preference-
adjusted labour endowment βi will aﬀect voter preferences over (τr, τw). So, generally, there is multidi-
mensionality in the preference parameters, as well as in the policy space, and indeed, it is possible to show
that generally, there will be no Condorcet winner. Our approach, following Persson-Tabellini(2000) Ch
12, is to impose a linear restriction on the relationship between the labour and capital endowments of any
agent. This is suﬃcient to ensure that voters have intermediate preferences (Persson-Tabellini(2000),
Definition 4), and so a Condorcet winner exists. Specifically, we assume that αi = a + bβi, and
a = (1− b)/n to ensure that the conditions
P
i∈N αi =
P
i∈N βi = 1 are satisfied. Then (13) becomes
ui(τw, τr) = (F 0(1)b+ w(1))βi − (τrb+ τw)βi + (F 0(1)− τ r)
µ
1− b
n
¶
+ v(τ r + τw) (14)
Note from (14) that the ideal taxes of agent i only depend on his preference-adjusted labour
endowment (and the constant (1 − b)/n). With these preferences, there exists a unique Condorcet
Winner (τw, τ r) ∈ Sc, which is the ideal tax vector of the individual with the median preference-
adjusted labour endowment. Above, we defined this individual as q : here, for convenience, we label
this voter m, where m denotes the median preference-adjusted labour endowment. So, the equilibrium
taxes (τ cw, τ cr) maximise um(τw, τ r), as defined in (13), subject to the constraint that (τw, τ r) ∈ Sc. The
following proposition characterises these taxes:
Proposition 5. (i) Assume βm < αm, v0(0) > αm > v0(F (1)). Then τ cw = w(1), and v0(w(1) + τr) =
αm. (ii) Assume βm > αm, v0(0) > βm > v0(F (1)). Then τ cr = F 0(1), and v0(F 0(1) + τw) = βm.
Proof. The proof is standard, given the objective function (13), the constraints (τw, τr) ∈ Sc, and the
strict concavity of v. ¤
Part (i) of this Proposition13 is illustrated below in Figure 2. As is clear in that figure, the
opportunity cost of the public good for the median voter is αm. If demand for the public good at this
cost is below w(1) - the maximum labour tax - the maximum labour tax is employed, and the remainder
of the tax revenue is used to subsidise capital. If demand for the public good at this cost is above w(1),
the maximum labour tax is employed, and the additional revenue is raised though taxing capital. Part
(ii) has a similar interpretation.
Figure 2 in here
Now consider the open economy case. Here, as each country is small, voters take ro as fixed and
13Note that the condition v0(0) >max{αm,βm} > v0(F (1)) ensures positive provision and positive private consumption.
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thus from (5), they perceive that k = k(ro + τr). So, from (7), the pay-oﬀ of agent i in any country, is
ui(τw, τ r, ro) ≡ roαi + (w(k(ro + τr))− τw)βi + v(τw + τ rk(ro + τ r)). (15)
Now note that only the weights βi given by the preference-adjusted labour endowment will aﬀect
voter preferences over (τw, τr). So, the relevant preference space is unidimensional and the intermediate
preference condition in Persson-Tabellini(2000) is automatically satisfied, whatever the relationship
between the labour and capital endowments. So, the voter with the median preference-adjusted labour
endowment, m, is the median voter, and consequently, the Condorcet-winning taxes (τow, τor) in the
open economy maximise um(τw, τr, ro) subject to the feasibility constraints on taxes that (τw, τr) ∈ So.
Note that in the open economy case, (τow, τor) depends on ro, but as all countries are identical, the only
possible equilibrium is where taxes are the same in all countries, and hence ro is such that k(ro+τor) = 1.
These facts imply the following characterization of equilibrium taxes in the open economy:
Proposition 6. Assume v0(0) > βm. If v0(w(1)) ≤ βm, τor = 0 and τow solves v0(τw) = βm. If
v0(w(1)) > βm, τor = 0, and τ cw = w(1).
Proof. The proof is given in the Appendix.¤
Thus the capital tax is set to zero, whatever the labour and capital endowments of the median
voter. This result is reminiscent of the well-known finding that under non-cooperation, countries that
satisfy the assumptions of the aggregate production eﬃciency theorem of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971)
find it optimal not to tax capital at source.14 These assumptions are satisfied here, as returns from
investment are certain, there is free capital mobility, all commodities (including labour) can be taxed,
and producers are perfectly competitive.
4.2 Capital Market Integration and Tax Competition
Comparing Propositions 5 and 6, the consequences of CMI for taxation of capital are clear. Generally,
the tax on capital changes from τ cr to zero. So, whenever τ cr > 0 we have confirmation of the ”standard”
kind of result that international tax competition lowers capital taxes. On the other hand, if τ cr < 0, we
have the opposite. It then follows immediately from Propositions 5 and 6 that:
Proposition 7. International tax competition raises capital taxes i.e. τ cr < 0 iﬀ αm > max{βm, v0(w(1))},
and (weakly) lowers capital taxes otherwise.
To interpret this condition, note that what is required is that both (i) the median voter is a
”capitalist” i.e. βm < αm and (ii) he does not value the public good too highly i.e. αm > v0(w(1)).
The first condition ensures, in equilibrium, the tax on labour is always at a maximum, and the second
ensures that not all of the tax revenue from the labour tax is used to fund the public good, leaving some
excess to fund a capital subsidy.
14See, for instance, Gordon (1986) and Razin and Sadka (1991).
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Note that this comparison is rather simpler than in the case with no labour income tax. However,
this simplicity has been purchased at the cost of making a rather strong assumption about the joint
distribution of labour and capital endowments. The extent to which this assumption can be relaxed is
discussed in Section 4.3.
Before leaving this Section we also discuss briefly the case of non-negative taxes. If subsidies were
ruled out then, as it is obvious from the proof of Proposition 6, the ideal policy mix of the median voter
under CMI would still be given by Proposition 6 i.e. τor = 0. Accordingly, if either αm < βm or v0(w(1))
> αm > βm CMI would lead to a decrease in capital taxes, as Proposition 5 implies that τ cr > 0. If,
on the other hand, αm > βm and αm ≥ v0(w(1)) the median voter’s ideal capital tax under a closed
economy is at the corner, i.e. τ cr = 0. So, in the absence of subsidies, if the median voter is a capitalist
and does not value the public good highly, capital is not taxed whether the economy is closed or open.
Clearly, then, if subsidies cannot be deployed CMI cannot lead to higher capital taxes.
4.3 Relaxing the Intermediate Preference Assumption
One strong assumption made in Section 4 was that the endowments of capital and labour were linearly
related. This was done in order to demonstrate the existence of Condorcet winner in the closed economy,
when both labour and capital taxes could be set separately. Here, we briefly argue that this assumption
can be relaxed if some minimal assumptions are made on the voting agenda over the set of alternatives
Sc.
Assume that {αi}i∈N , {βi}i∈N are perfectly rank-correlated, either positively or negatively. This
is equivalent to saying that αi = f(βi), where f is either a strictly increasing or a strictly decreasing
function. This clearly weakens the assumption that αi = a+ bβi made in Section 4.1. With this weaker
assumption, a Condorcet Winner will generally not exist in Sc. But suppose that we impose issue-by-
issue voting i.e. majority voting on either τr, followed by τw, or vice versa. Generally, as ui(τw, τr) is
not additively separable in τw, τr, the order of items on the agenda will matter. In particular, this will
occur when the median voter over τw is not the median voter over τr (see, for instance, Ordeshook(1986)
and Muller(1989)). In this case, issue-by-issue voting will give two possible outcomes, depending on the
agenda.
On the other hand, when endowments are perfectly (positively or negatively) rank-correlated,
then clearly voter m = (n+1)/2 is the median voter over both τw, τ r. In that case, whatever the order,
m is eﬀectively dictator, so issue-by-issue majority voting will lead to a choice of (τw, τ r) that maximise
um(τw, τr) over the set of feasible taxes. Then, Proposition 5 - and therefore Proposition 7 - continues
to apply.
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5 Capital Controls and Capital Taxes: Some Evidence
Here we briefly discuss the evidence on the relationship between capital controls and taxes on capital,
to justify our assertion that the relationship between financial liberalization and reductions in taxes on
capital is weak. The usual way of measuring financial liberalization is to construct some coding of the
legal restrictions on capital movements in or out of country.
One widely used coding15, originally due to Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) is a binary one,
with a value of 1 indicating significant restrictions on the capital account. This coding also has three
binary variables indicating the presence of restrictions on the current account: multiple exchange rates,
restrictions on current account transactions, and surrender of export proceeds. Quinn (1997) oﬀers a
more sophisticated coding that also measures the intensity of capital controls16. Both of these authors
also construct a coding of joint restrictions on the capital and current account, which we also use17. All
of these variables are normalized between 0 and 1 with a higher value indicating fewer restrictions, with
Quinn’s and Milesi-Ferretti’s variables denotes CQ, EXQ, CMF, EXMF in obvious notation.
As for taxes on capital, in practice, these are both personal and corporate. We focus on corporate
taxes, and in particular on the marginal tax rate on incremental investment, the so-called eﬀective
marginal tax rate, or EMTR. Of the various emprical measures of corporate tax, this corresponds
most closely to the tax studied in the Zodrow-Mieskowski model, which is the canonical model in the
literature, and the one we use in our analysis. We use a forward-looking measure of the EMTR, further
discussed in Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano(2003), available for a panel of 21 OECD countries over
the period 1983-1999.
Table 1 below shows regressions using this panel data set. The dependent variable is the EMTR,
Ti,t. Explanatory variables are: the lagged dependent variable (included because there is considresable
persistence in taxes), the capital control dummy Dit, and various control variables that might plausibly
aﬀect tax-setting18. There are four diﬀerent regressions, each one corresponding to a diﬀerent measure of
15The main source for researchers on legal restrictions is the information in the International Monetary Fund’s Exchange
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions annual.
16For 56 countries over the period 1950 to 1997, and an additional eight countries starting in 1954, Quinn distinguishes
seven categories of statutory measures. Four are current account restrictions, two are capital account restrictions, and
one denotes membership of international organizations, such as the OECD, which may constrain the ability of a country
to restrict exchange and capital flows. The capital account restrictions are coded on a 0-4 scale, the current account
restrictions on a 0-8 scale, and membership on a 0-2 scale with half-point increments. In every case, a higher number
denotes a weaker restriction.
17Some have the view that there is fungibility between accounts, i.e. “where capital controls do exist, they can be
avoided through current account transactions, and, as such, consideration of restrictions on the current account and other
restrictions is necessary to measure the eﬀectiveness of controls” (Mody and Murshid (2002)).
18These are the proportion of the population over 65 (POPOLD), the top rate of personal income tax (TOPINC),
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capital or excahnge controls CQ, EXQ, CMF, EXMF. All regresions also pass standard mis-specification
tests for serial and spatial correaltion of the errors.
It is clear from Table 1 that all measures of the relaxation of capital and exchange controls have an
insignificant and numerically small eﬀect on the EMTR. In the case of CMF, EXMF, this eﬀect is in fact
positive. This is broadly consistent with the findings of Quinn(1997) and Rodrik(1997): Garrett(1998)
and Swank and Steinmo(2002) who simply find that capital controls have no significant eﬀect.
Table 1 in here
These findings are certrainly consistent with our model. As remarked in the introduction, and
discussed in more detail below, thery are also consistent with versions of the ZMW model with either
(i) partial foreign ownership of the fixed factor, or (ii) where the government supplies an infrastructure
public good. With (i), CMI enables ”tax exporting” to the foreign owner of the fixed factor, and
with (ii), CMI causes ”amenity competiion” which may drive up the tax rate. Howover, the current
state of knowledge does not allow us to say which of these models (if any) best explains the empricval
finding that CMI seems to mave little eﬀect on capital taxes. Alsthough there is a growing empirical
literature on tax competition (see e.g. Brueckner(2003)), there is (to our knowledge) no emprical work
on amenity competition. Also, observed levels of foreign ownership of equities are low (Bailey et al.
(1999)): whether they are high enough to explain the findings above is an open quesion.
6 Related Literature
Apart from the seminal work of PT, our paper is related to two parts of the now vast literature on
capital tax competition. First, and most importantly, there are papers that have explicitly or implicitly
derived conditions under which Nash equilibrium taxes rise in some or all countries following capital
market integration.19
The relevant work can be subdivided in two. First, there are contributions that study asymmetries
between countries. For example, DePater and Myers (1994) study a version of the ZMWmodel but allow
for asymmetric countries that do not take the world interest rate as fixed. In that model, if a country is
a suﬃciently large capital importer it will set a higher tax when capital becomes more mobile. This is
intuitive as a tax on capital lowers the interest rate i.e. the cost of capital to an importing country. In a
well-known paper, Wilson (1987) considers a model with trade in goods as well as capital: specifically,
two goods, one labour-intensive and one capital-intensive. In that model, even if countries are symmetric
country size as measured by GDP relative to the US (SIZE), the unemployment rate (UNEMPL), and the debt-to-GDP
ratio (DEBT). For precise data definitions and sources, see Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano(2004).
19For some excellent surveys of the literature on capital tax competition see Wilson (2000) and Wilson and Wildasin
(2004).
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ex ante, in equilibrium, one set of countries produces the capital-intensive good and set low tax rates
(these countries import capital), and the other set of countries produce the labour-intensive good and
set high tax rates (these countries export capital). In the first group of countries taxes are lower under
perfect capital mobility. This can be thought of as a model of endogenous asymmetry across countries.
Of course, the results of these papers are weaker than ours, in the sense that in equilibrium, only a
subset of the countries raise their taxes following capital market integration.
Second, some recent papers present symmetric models where under certain conditions, taxes in
all countries rise following capital market integration. The first, Huizinga and Nielsen (1997) relies on
a tax-exporting argument. They allow agents in one country to own a share of the immobile factor
(land) in the other countries. So, following capital market integration, the capital tax set in any country
i is partially shifted to owners of land in other countries. If the level of foreign ownership is large
enough, taxes in all countries rise following capital market liberalization.20 Noiset(1995) and Wooders,
Zissimos and Dhillon(2001) consider a second variant of the ZMW model where the tax funds a public
infrastructure good, rather than a final good. If, at Nash equilibrium, the degree of complementarity
between capital and the infrastructure input is suﬃciently large,21 taxes with capital mobility will be
ineﬃciently high. The intuition is simply that with strong complementarity, countries have an incentive
to overinvest in infrastructure.
Our distinctive contribution to this literature is that we show that a tax rise following CMI is
possible when the political process is modelled realistically, not because of some economic modification
or elaboration of the ZMW model. Specifically, in our model, a benevolent (i.e. welfare maximizing)
dictator would always choose lower taxes in the open economy: higher taxes arise because of the
interaction of the ”dictatorship” of the median voter with the tax incidence eﬀect.
A final related paper here is Kessler, Lulfesmann and Myers (2002). In that model, agents
diﬀer only with respect to their capital endowment, and capital taxes fund a lump-sum transfer to all
residents. Moreover, capital is perfectly mobile, and labour is imperfectly mobile (there are migration
costs). Their main result is that in this setting, a reduction in migration costs (further integration of
the labour market) leads to an increase in the capital tax when countries are symmetric. The intuition
is the following: ”The integration of labour markets reduces the incentives for voters to attract foreign
capital through lowering national tax rates because it at the same time causes an inflow of labour, which
20A further paper that fits this category is Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002), where tax jurisdictions are identical, but
there is a federal government which taxes capital as well. This feature introduces a vertical tax externality: countries do
not take into account the erosion of the federal tax base which results from an increase in local capital tax. If this vertical
externality is large relative to the standard horizontal tax externalities, then over-taxation will result.
21Specifically, the cross-partial derivative of output with respect to capital and infrastructure must be suﬃciently large
at Nash equilibrium. An assumption suﬃcient to rule this out was made by Zodrow and Mieszkowski(1986) in their
original paper, so they also found under-taxation with an infrastructure public good.
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is detrimental to a majority” (Kessler, Lulfesmann and Myers(2002)). So, both the result and the
reasoning behind it are rather diﬀerent to our paper. More broadly, however, both their paper and this
one indicate that the under-taxation results of the classic Zodrow-Mieskowski model are not robust to
apparently quite minor changes.
The second related literature comprises several papers that have studied choice of taxes via
majority voting in variants of the ZMW and related models. Apart from the work of Kessler et. al.
(2002) we have mentioned in the Introduction, Grazzini and van Ypersele (1999) have asymmetric
countries and also heterogeneity of capital endowments. They study Nash equilibrium taxes in the open
economy with majority voting in each country, but do not study the closed economy equilibrium (their
focus is on when a proposal for a minimum tax on capital will be unanimously accepted). Consequently,
they do not identify the incidence and shifting median voter eﬀects. Kessler et. al. (2003)’s model
is very similar to Grazzini and van Ypersele (1999): heterogenous countries, and also agents within a
country diﬀering with respect to capital (but not labour) endowments.22 They study Nash equilibria
with majority voting in both countries both with and without capital mobility. However, their additional
assumptions ensure that in any country, the equilibrium tax is always lower with capital mobility than
without23.
7 Conclusions
This paper provides one possible explanation for why taxes on capital may not fall, but rise, following
capital market integration. Our explanation is based on three simple ingredients: equilibrium tax-
shifting in the ZMWmodel, heterogeneity between agents within countries, and decision-making through
a political process such as majority voting, rather than benevolent dictatorship. These interact to
produce the incidence eﬀect on equilibrium taxes following capital market integration. If the diﬀerences
between the median preference-adjusted endowments of the mobile factor (capital), and the fixed factor
(land) are large enough, the incidence eﬀect may more than oﬀset the usual eﬀects of tax competition,
and cause equilibrium taxes to rise. We also show that the same logic applies to the case where capital
and labour can be taxed separately.
22In fact, they just allow for two groups, rich and poor.
23Specifically, in their model, tax revenue is not spent on a public good but is returned in the form of a grant to every
agent. This can be formally captured in our model by writing γi = 1 and v(g) = g. Then, it is clear that in the closed
economy case, the median voter p will choose the maximum feasible tax because v0(g) = 1 > kp, and indeed, that is their
result. So, the open-economy tax cannot be higher than the closed-economy tax.
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A Appendix
Example A1. Preferences and technology are the same as in Example 1. Also, n = 3. We first write
down conditions that hold on α2,β2, the preference-adjusted endowments of the median voter. Thus,
as n = 3, the median voter cannot own more than half the endowment of any asset, i.e. αp,βq ≤ 0.5.
Combining this with A1, we get:
1/2 ≥ αP ≥
1
2
− ζ(1− φ).
Note that, due to ζ > 0 and 0 < φ < 1, this set of parameter values is non-empty.
Again, combining β2 ≤ 0.5 with A2, we get:
1/2 ≥ β2 ≥ [
1
2
− ζ(1− φ)](2φ− 1
φ
)
As ζ(1− φ) ∈ (0, 1/2) and 2φ−1φ < 1, we have that this set as well is non-empty.
Also, recall that
ζ <
1
2
+ φζ (16)
from v0(F 0(1)) > 0. So, together, (??),(??),(16) with φ ∈ (0, 1) and ζ > 0 define a feasible set for
φ, ζ. Next, note that in this example,
η =
ψ
β
− 1
= µ(τ(αp), 1)− 1
=
1
1 + τ(αp)/F 00(1)
− 1
=
1
1− ( 12 − αp)/ζφ
− 1
=
(12 − αp2)
c− ( 12 − αp)
≤ 1/2
c− 12
where c = ζφ. So, it is clear that as c → ∞, then η → 0. Finally, it is possible to show that we can
choose feasible ζ,φ such that c = φζ for any c > 0.24 So, we can choose parameter values such that
η ' 0 to any desired approximation. ¤
Proof of Proposition 6. The equilibrium taxes maximise (15) subject to τw ≤ w(k(ro + τr)), 0 ≤
τ rk + tw. Ignoring the latter constraint, the first-order conditions are:
−βm + v0(τw + kτr)− ξ = 0
−kβm + v0(τw + kτr)[k + τ rk0]− ξk = 0
24In particular, for any c > 0 the admissible set is given by ζ ∈ (c, c+ 1
2
) and φ ∈ (0, 1).
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So, if the constraint τw ≤ w(k(ro + τ r)) is not binding, ξ = 0, and we have
−βm + v0(τw + kτ r) = 0
−kβm + v0(τw + kτ r)[k + τrk0] = 0
At equilibrium, k = 1, and so
−βm + v0(τw + τr) = 0
−βm + v0(τw + τ r)[1 + τrk0] = 0
The unique solution to these equations is τr = 0, βm = v0(τw). Given v0(0) > βm we have that τw > 0
and thereby positive provision. For the constraint τw ≤ w(k(ro+τr)) not to be binding at this solution,
we require τw ≤ w(1), and thus βm ≥ v0(w(1)).
If the constraint τw ≤ w(k(ro + τr)) is binding, ξ > 0 and we have τw = w(k(ro + τ r)) = w(1)
in equilibrium. Also, in equilibrium, as k = 1, τr and ξ solve
−βm + v0(w(1) + τ r)− ξ = 0
−βm + v0(w(1) + τr)[1 + τ rk0]− ξ = 0.
and hence τr = 0, and ξ = v0(w(1)) − βm. As τr = 0 and τw = w(1), provision is positive. For the
constraint τw ≤ w(k(ro+τr)) to be binding at this solution, we require ξ > 0 and thus βm < v0(w(1)). ¤
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Table 1 
 
Dependent Variable:   EMTR 
 CMF EXMF CQ EXQ 
Ti,t-1 0.783*** 
(0.045) 
0.788*** 
(0.044) 
0.781*** 
(0.043) 
0.781*** 
(0.043) 
Dit 0.009 
(0.004) 
0.015 
(0.013) 
-0.011 
(0.020) 
-0.012 
(0.020) 
POPOLD -0.314 
(0.332) 
-0.322 
(0.362) 
-0.096 
(0.309) 
-0.074 
(0.304) 
TOPINC 0.090** 
(0.040) 
0.0890* 
(0.040) 
0.068* 
(0.036) 
0.069* 
(0.038) 
SIZE -0.475 
(0.298) 
-0.457 
(0.308) 
-0.517** 
(0.250) 
-0.520** 
(0.251) 
UNEMPL -0.270* 
(0.145) 
-0.226* 
(0.134) 
-0.129 
(0.119) 
-0.135 
(0.116) 
DEBT 0.035* 
(0.021) 
0.033 
(0.021) 
0.025 
(0.019) 
-0.025 
(0.018) 
Country 
Dummies 
yes yes yes yes 
R2 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.90 
LM serial* 2.013 1.785 0.567 0.583 
LM spatial** 0.0008 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 
Obs 250 250 290 290 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.  
* Tests for first –order serial correlation in the error term: distributed as χ2 
(1) 
* * Tests for spatial correlation in the error term: distributed as χ2 (1)   
 
 
 
